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ABSTRACT. Those studying and analyzing Western Pacific strategic trends and develop- 
ments have access to multiple unclassified analyses of security trends in this region 
covering these waters and adjacent countries. These information resources are produced by 
military and government agencies from multiple countries, multinational public policy 
research institutions, popular and scholarly journals, and Internet resources featuring text, 
data, webcasts, and imagery. One of these resources is the U.S.–China Economic and 
Security Review Commission established in the 2001 National Defense Authorization Act.  
This article argues that this organization’s analyses should be considered essential reading 
by civilian and military policymakers and individuals and organizations interested in under- 
standing the continually developing and evolving factors making the Western Pacific an 
increasingly important factor in U.S. and international geopolitical interests. Contents of 
this work include scrutiny of commission annual reports, hearings, and studies produced by 
commission professional staff and contractors covering Western Pacific strategic issues.  
This bipartisan commission has achieved relative unanimity in its conclusions and its work 
should be consulted by all interested in Western Pacific strategic and economic issues. 
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Individuals and organizations studying Western Pacific strategic trends and devel- 
opments have access to multiple unclassified analyses of these waters and the 
countries adjacent to them. These information resources are produced by military 
and government agencies from multiple countries, a multinational variety of public 
policy research institutions, and popular and scholarly journals and Internet 
resources. One of these resources is the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review 
Commission and this paper argues that its analyses should be considered essential 
reading by civilian and military policymakers and individuals and organizations 
interested in understanding the continually developing and evolving factors making 
the Western Pacific an increasingly important factor for U.S. and international 
economic and geopolitical interests. 
This commission was established in Section 1238 of the 2001 National Defense 
Authorization Act. This statute directed this organization to “monitor, investigate, 
and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade 
and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of 
China.”1 Its organic statute mandated that the Commission’s membership consist of 
12 members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President Pro 
Tempore based on consultations with each chambers majority and minority leaders 
and from the chairs of these chambers Armed Services and international trade over- 
sight committees. Commission members serve two year terms; are required to have 
expertise in U.S.–China relations and national security matters; they may be 
reappointed for additional terms of service; are provided with professional staff to 
carry out their responsibilities; each member has one vote; and the commission is 
required to submit annual classified and unclassified reports by March 1 of each 
year.2 
     Annual report contents concerning military matters are to address Sino–U.S. 
trade covering military systems or dual use items that can be used for military 
purposes; Chinese acquisition of military or dual-use technologies from the U.S. by 
trade, purchase, or technology transfer which may produce weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation or undermine international agreements or U.S. laws 
dealing with nonproliferation, analysis of official Chinese statements and writings 
concerning China’s military competition with the U.S. and Beijing’s desire to gain 
leverage over or cooperation with the U.S. and its Asian allies, military actions 
taken by China that may affect U.S. national security and the security of the U.S.’ 
Asian allies; the extent that China’s trade surplus with the U.S. enhances its 
military budget; and an overall assessment of the status of security challenges 
presented by China to the U.S. and whether these security challenges are increasing 
or decreasing from previous years.3 
The Commission’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget was $3.5 million and its 12 members 
were augmented by a professional support staff of 18.4 Its membership as of 
October 2016 consists of Chair Dennis C. Shea; Vice-Chair Carolyn Bartholomew; 
Peter Brookes; Robin Cleveland; former Senator Byron Dorgan; Jeffrey Fiedler; 
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former Senator Carte Goodwin; Daniel Slane, former Senator James Talent, 
Katherine Tobin, Michael Wessel, Dr. Larry Worzel, and Executive Director 
Michael Danis.5 
    During its existence, the commission has issued numerous annual reports, con- 
ducted multiple public hearings, and its staff have issued several reports documenting 
Western Pacific strategic developments which are accessible through its website 
www.uscc.gov/. Content from these annual reports, hearings, and commissioned 




The commission, like many U.S. Government agencies, issues annual reports 
documenting its work activities and containing policy recommendations as part of 
its congressional reporting requirements. The commission’s first annual report, 
issued in July 2002, contains chapters on Chinese Perceptions of the United States 
and Strategic Thinking; Proliferation and Chinese Relations with Terrorist Spon- 
soring States; Cross-Strait Security Issues; The Defense Budget and the Military 
Economy; and Technology Transfers and Military Acquisitions Policy.6  
     Multiple recommendations were made by commissioners on the panoply of 
issues affecting these countries bilateral relationship including Western Pacific 
security interests. These recommendations include: 
 The U.S. Government expanding its collection, translation, and analysis of open 
source Chinese language materials and making them widely available; 
 The Commission recommending Congress encouraging the Defense Department 
to renew efforts to develop military-to-military confidence building measures in 
context of a strategic dialogue with China based on reciprocity, transparency; con- 
sistency, and mutual benefit; 
 The U.S. should continue prohibiting satellite launch cooperation with China 
until Beijing implements an effective export control system consistent with its 
November 2000 commitment to restrict WMD proliferation and associated tech- 
nologies to other countries and entities; 
 DOD continuing substantive military dialogue with Taiwan and conduct 
exchanges on threat analysis, doctrine, and force planning; 
 DOD preparing a biannual report on critical elements of the U.S. defense in- 
dustrial base becoming dependent on Chinese imports or Chinese-owned companies; 
and 
 DOD and the FBI jointly assessing Chinese targeting of sensitive U.S. weapons-
related technologies, the means used for gaining access to these technologies; and 
the steps that have or should be taken to deny China such access to and acquisition 
of these technologies and capabilities.7 
 
The Commission’s June 1, 2007 annual report also included significant assessments 
of China’s Western Pacific military developments. Findings included China being 
 10 
likely to use irregular warfare strategies including special operations and cyber 
attacks against U.S. regional bases in South Korea and Taiwan and potential cyber 
attacks against the U.S. homeland directed against U.S. financial, energy, industry, 
and communications infrastructures. It noted continuing increases in Beijing’s 
military spending which the Pentagon believes totals $90–$135 billion with the 
majority of its military expenditures targeting its naval and air forces. 
Naval force augmentations include enhancing air defense and surface warfare 
capabilities and developing blue water naval capabilities by launching ten nuclear 
powered Shang class submarines. Air Force enhancements include increasing its 
number of SU-27 and SU-30 fighter fleet to gain air superiority over Taiwan and 
developing a fleet capable of integration into theater wide command, control, com- 
puters, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
system.8  
     Commissioners also toured China between April 22 and May 1, 2007 that year.  
Their report noted that China’s Deputy Foreign Minister for North American Affairs 
Xie Feng noted that Beijing’s January 2007 destruction of a satellite claiming that 
this test was not conducted for changing Beijing’s policies on outer space or air 
space. Commissioners also met with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) scholars and 
strategists at the Academy of Military Sciences. These officers maintained that 
Beijing’s military transformation would continue stressing informatization and 
focusing on modernizing air, naval, and strategic missile forces. They claimed U.S. 
concerns about China’s modernization and lack of transparency are misplaced 
while maintaining that the U.S.’ global strike concept is destabilizing because it 
threatens instead of strengthens the nuclear threshold. PLA personnel also disagreed 
over whether computer network attacks are an act of war.9 
Topics addressed in the 2014 Annual Report include Chinese military and 
security issues, Beijing’s military modernization, China and Asia’s evolving 
security architecture, and recent developments in China’s relationships with North 
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Commission conclusions from this report on 
Western Pacific security issues include: 
 Beijing concluding the U.S.-led security East Asia security architecture does not 
benefit its core interests of regime preservation, economic, and social development, 
and territorial integrity. During 2014 Beijing’s leaders began promoting a regional 
security vision marginalizing the U.S. and seeking to give Asians greater say in 
their security affairs as opposed to the existing strong network of U.S. alliances and 
partnerships in East Asia. 
 China engaging in a sustained and substantial military buildup to shift the 
regional balance of power and using its increasing military advantage to gain a 
dominant East Asian sphere of influence. 
 Beijing’s security relations with Japan are deteriorating over the Senkaku Islands 
and grievances over Japan’s wartime past. However, Beijing’s relations with South 
Korea are improving as China seeks increased cooperation over North Korea.  
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Japan balances against China by increasing its military capabilities while South 
Korea seeks to hedge its security relations with both Washington and Beijing. 
 Increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) has caused 
Southeast Asia and Australia to build new defense relationships, strengthen military 
and paramilitary capabilities, and emphasize the role of regional institutions and 
international law to manage disputes. 
 Both China and the U.S. are seeking to increase their security ties with Australia 
with Beijing seeking to counteract the alliance between Canberra and Washington.10 
 
Concerning the Korean Peninsula, the commission report noted increasing tension 
between Beijing and Pyongyang, China’s concern with the North’s nuclear program 
and concomitant concern with possible U.S. military intervention which could be 
inimical to Beijing’s interests, and increase refugee flows into China. This document 
also stressed concern about the lack of trilateral contingency communication 
between Beijing, Seoul, and Washington being insufficient to void accidents,  
miscalculations, and conflict.11 
Security and strategic recommendations made by the Commission for this region 
include Congress funding naval shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its 
Asia-Pacific presence to at least 67 ships and rebalance regional homeports to 60% 
by 2020 in order to gain regional capacity and presence to counterbalance Beijing’s 
increasing military capabilities and surge naval assets if a contingency occurs; 
Congress appointing an outside expert panel to conduct a net assessment of the 
Sino-American military balance and recommending the sufficiency of current U.S. 
military plans and budgets to address emerging security requirements; insure the 
sufficiency of open source collection, production, and dissemination capabilities on 
Chinese security issues; directing U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) to brief 
Congress on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) participation in the 2014 
Rim of the Pacific exercise; requiring DOD to tell Congress the reason for its 
military-to-military engagement planning with the PLA including future proposed 
programs; and directing the Government Accountability Office to compile an 
unclassified report, with classified annex, examining Chinese conventional and 
nuclear ballistic missile capabilities, intentions, and force structures.12  
The Commission’s 2015 annual report section on Sino-U.S. security relations 
addressed overall security and foreign affairs developments, Chinese space and 
counterspace programs, and its offensive missile forces.13 Cybersecurity received 
particular notice in this report with its contents noting that China has been 
conducting the world’s largest and most intensive foreign intelligence gathering 
effort since at least 2009 with Beijing exfiltrating large volumes of data from U.S. 
networks and sharing it with Chinese competitors.  Examples of sectors targeted by 
Chinese cyber hackers include electronics, telecommunications, robotics, data 
services, and satellite communications and imagery. PLA digital spy network Unit 
61398 was charged by Mandiant Corporation in 2013 with systematically stealing 
hundreds of terabytes of data spanning 20 major industries with many of these 
attacks striking U.S. military, industrial, and educational targets.14 
 12 
This report also noted the 2015 Chinese defense white paper and its elevation of 
the maritime domain in Chinese strategic thinking, placing acute emphasis on open 
seas protection, developing an increasingly incremental approach to attain desired 
territorial ambitions while avoiding conflict and limiting forceful reactions from 
opposing actors, that space and cyberspace have become commanding heights in 
emerging strategic competition, and the need for greater unification, coordination, 
and streamlining in civilian and military integration and defense policymaking.15 
     Satellite imagery referenced in this document from January 2015 indicated 
Chinese upgrading of existing military infrastructure on Nanji Island, which is part 
of an island chain of the coast of Zhejiang Province approximately 160 nautical 
miles from the disputed Senkaku Islands. It appears Nanji hosts a heliport with ten 
landing pads and wind turbines along with previously existing radar and com- 
munications infrastructure. This makes it capable of enforcing China’s East China 
Sea Air Defense Identification Zone and serve power projection purposes for 
coastal defense purposes.16 
     Commission conclusions on these security developments include continuing 
deterioration in Sino-U.S. Western Pacific security relations due to Beijing’s 
aggressive behavior in the SCS, relentless cyberespionage against the U.S., and 
continued development of anti-access aerial denial (A2AD) capabilities seeking to 
restrict U.S. military freedom of movement; Beijing bolstering its ECS dispute 
with Japan by constructing 16 structures to facilitate natural gas exploitation in 
disputed waters, rapid growth in Chinese international arms exports making them 
competitive with those of Washington and Moscow; and a shift in the regional 
balance of power from Washington and its allies to Beijing.17 
      Subsequent conclusions derived from the commission’s 2015 report include 
gradual acceleration of Chinese space program capability while Russian and U.S. 
space programs have dwindling resources and goals, Beijing’s belief that its space 
power involves commercial, defense industry, military, and political components 
supporting Chinese military space, counterspace, and conventional capabilities,  
that advancing counterspace capabilities increases the likelihood of jeopardizing 
U.S. national security satellites in all orbital regimes, that China is building a 
foundation for future co-orbital antisatellite systems including jammers, robotic 
arms, kinetic kill vehicles, and lasers; and that Beijing wants to increase its ability 
to monitor and strike U.S. aircraft, ships, and bases as far away as Guam along with 
eventually extending its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to 
reach the eastern Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean.18  
     Assessments derived from this treatise on Chinese missile forces are having its 
nuclear arsenal deter adversaries from engaging in a nuclear first strike by 
dissuading risk taking by such an adversary due to nuclear escalation concerns; 
striving to pursue a theater nuclear capability to flexibly use nuclear weapons to 
deescalate or favorably shape conflict direction; developing a credible second strike 
capability to emphasize surviving a first strike by diversifying from land-based silo 
systems to absorbing nuclear strikes and retaliating through ICBM’s, SLBMs, and 
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ALBM’s, developing cruise missiles that are increasingly difficult for the U.S. to 
detect and defend against including missiles capable of challenging U.S. Navy 
defenses; attempting to develop measures to improve its abilities to penetrate 
opposing missile defenses such as MIRV’s, maneuverable reentry vehicles, and 
hypersonic weapons.19 
Key commission force structure and strategic posture recommendations include: 
 Continuing congressional support of DOD efforts to cost-effectively reduce the 
vulnerability of U.S. space assets by developing smaller, harder and more distributed 
satellites, and non-space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets such 
as unmanned vehicles. 
 Congress directing DOD, the Air Force, and intelligence community to jointly 
prepare a classified report conducting a net assessment of Chinese and U.S. 
counterspace capabilities. This document should include a strategic plan for  
deterring strikes against U.S. assets, using active and passive systems, given other 
countries rapid advances in kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace technology. 
 Congress directing DOD to provide an unclassified assessment of PLA Second 
Artillery Force missile and launch inventory by type in future editions of DOD’s 
annual reports on Chinese military power. 
 Congress directing DOD to report on the potential benefits and costs of in- 
corporating ground-launched short, medium, and intermediate conventional cruise 
and ballistic missile systems into the U.S.’ Asia-Pacific defense force structure 
while also exploring how such systems could help the U.S. military sustain a cost-
effective deterrence posture. 
 Continuing congressional support of initiatives to harden U.S. Asia-Pacific 
bases, including the Pacific Airpower Resiliency Initiative, to increase the cost and 
uncertainty of conventional ballistic and cruise missile strikes against these targets 
and encourage regional stability. 
 Continuing congressional support of emerging missile defense initiatives  
including directed energy and rail gun technologies and requiring DOD report to 
relevant jurisdictional committees on the status of current component sourcing 




Commission hearings are also a method where information is obtained by con- 
gressional, independent, or other executive agencies to gather information about 
government agency activities, expose operational failures, see congressional 
committees exercise their constitutional oversight and funding responsibilities, and 
lead to legislative revisions and recommendations enabling agencies to more 
effectively carry out their responsibilities.21 
     The Commission regularly conducts hearings examining how Chinese military 
and strategic developments impact the Western Pacific. A January 17, 2002 com- 
mission hearing examined the impact of military and dual-use technology exports 
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to China. George Scalise maintained that Cold War era export controls on China 
were counterproductive to U.S. policy goals such as democratizing China and 
integrating it into the global economy.22 However, Paul Godwin warned that China’s 
lack of transparency makes assessing Chinese manufacturing and technological 
capabilities very tentative, asserting that China wants to threaten U.S. bases in the 
Western Pacific by keeping us as far away from China as possible, and asserted 
that over the next 50 years China wants to restrict U.S. military capabilities to 
approach within 600 miles of China’s coast without being vulnerable to Beijing’s 
retaliation.23 
     A February 6, 2004 hearing was the commission’s first of a periodic series of 
hearings examining China’s military modernization and the cross-strait military 
balance with Taiwan. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Richard P. Lawless noted the U.S. provides articles and services to Taiwan 
enabling it to maintain sufficient self-defense capability, address perceived short- 
comings in Taiwan’s readiness, and maintains capabilities to assist in Taipei’s 
defense if required. He went on to add that the U.S. opposed Taiwanese indepen- 
dence and China using military force to transform Taiwan’s status.24 
     Richard D. Fisher, Jr. noted that acquiring Russian military weaponry enables 
China wage war with the ability to increase pressure on the U.S. to sustain Western 
Pacific deterrence, that the PLA has now become the world’s largest arms importer, 
and that these purchases may enhance its ability to launch successful operations 
against Taiwan.25 Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang noted the increasing importance of 
asymmetric warfare in Chinese military thought stressing that technological 
integration and globalization creates a new type of war transcending all boundaries 
and limits and that China’s military is developing strategies and techniques using 
deception, shock, and surprise to conquer Taiwan by gaining control of its infor- 
mation networks.26 
     Lyle J. Goldstein noted China’s significant undersea warfare expenditures, that 
submarines are a critical part of Beijing’s ongoing naval modernization, the in- 
creasing relevance of cruise missiles in their striking power capabilities, significant 
enhancements in China’s ballistic missile capability due to acquisition of Russian 
technology, and contending that Taiwan cannot defend itself from a concerted 
Chinese submarine campaign. Goldstein also contended that China was following 
the historical examples of Germany and the Soviet Union in using submarines to 
challenge the existing maritime preponderance of status quo naval powers.27 
     March 29–30, 2007 commission hearings on Chinese military modernization and 
its effect on the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific addressed a plethora of relevant themes 
including PLA modernization in traditional warfare capabilities, the Taiwan Strait 
military balance, the PLA’s information warfare, cyber operations, and other 
disruptive warfare capabilities, and PLA objectives in space. Testifying during this 
hearing Michael Vickers stressed China was likely to employ asymmetric warfare 
in any conflict including special operations and cyberattack against Taiwan and 
potentially U.S. bases and forces in that region. He went on to maintain that 
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emerging disruptive capabilities in nanotechnology and bioscience technology 
could augment new methods of clandestine and covert strategic attack.28 
     William Schneider made the following declaration about the direction of Chinese 
military acquisitions: 
 
China is acquiring modern capabilities that mimic those found in other 
contemporary defense establishments. China is modernizing its long-range 
nuclear weapons delivery systems in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms. The mobile land-based intercontinental DF-31 series – its upgraded 
land-based ICBMs – and the JL-1 submarine launched ballistic missile 
are counterparts to systems deployed by other major powers, though at 
present on a smaller scale.  
The military and strategic significance of these platforms will be 
magnified if they are equipped with multiple independently targeted re-
entry vehicles. The general purpose forces, especially those suitable for 
expeditionary campaigns and combined ground-air operations, are also 
being recapitalized and modernized. Two aircraft carriers are being 
acquired as are the current generation of Russian combat aircraft, diesel-
electric submarines, surface naval combatants, strategic airlift, airborne 
warning and control systems, and aerial tankers.  
More advanced indigenous aircraft will soon be deployed that lever the 
PRC’s access to advanced dual-use technologies from the United States, 
Europe and Japan.29 
 
U.S. Strategic Command Commander General James E. Cartwright stressed that 
China was “building what I would call a continuum of capability in space, all the 
way from low end temporary and reversible effects through kinetic effects through 
potentially nuclear capabilities. What is of note here is at the low end, they are not 
just looking at these and developing them, they have fielded a broad range of 
jamming anti-satellite type capabilities, position navigation and timing, and also 
ISR type capabilities, and they have proliferated them out in their forces to be 
routinized in their training and doctrine.”30 
Andrew Erickson stressed his belief that the PLA seeks to dominate the battle 
space of littorals around China with particular emphasis on the area around 
Taiwan. In his view this mindset is reflected in PLA developments in ballistic 
missile submarines, nuclear powered submarines, and landing program docks.  
Erickson also asserts that newer Chinese ships and aircraft give it the ability to 
extend its combat power further into the SCS and some of the Western Pacific and 
that Beijing’s emerging surface combatant classes possess sophisticated air and 
missile guidance radars with advanced long-range surface-to-air missiles.31 
James Lewis noted China has spent considerable effort on anti-satellite weapons 
and information operations which he believes Beijing intends to use to attack U.S. 
aircraft carriers and information operations. He also believes Chinese efforts in 
these areas aspire to enhance their deception and denial efforts including jamming 
satellite signals and spoofing targets.32 
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      Ehsan Ahrari stressed that China would not catch up with the U.S. in military 
research and development. Instead it sees asymmetric warfare as its niche and will 
continue looking for vulnerabilities in U.S. and allied military postures while 
focusing on offensive capabilities to inflict maximum military damage in the event 
of war.33 
The Commission’s May 20, 2008 hearing addressed Chinese space and cyber- 
space capabilities and proliferation practices. James Mulvenon noted he regularly 
receives Chinese emails with malware and that Chinese military literature regularly 
focuses on attacking U.S. reliance on computer networks to enhance the Western 
Pacific’s “Tyranny of Distance” by disrupting PACOM communication procedures 
and force response along with exploiting a perceived U.S. reluctance to incur 
casualties.34  
     Henry Sokolski warned that changes China makes to its nuclear policy or 
nuclear modernization program could induce other Asia-Pacific nations to acquire 
nuclear weapons ranging from Japan to Pakistan, Indian, and Saudi Arabia. He 
went on to recommend that the U.S. encourage China to cap further production of 
nuclear weapons usable fuels, that the State Department pressure China to stop 
producing fissile materials for nuclear purposes, and that China stop producing 
fissionable materials for military purposes.35 
     June 11, 2009 saw a commission hearing on the implications of China’s naval 
modernization. Specific topics addressed included the strategic impact of PLAN 
modernization, operational activities, technical developments, and views from 
members of Congress and former Secretaries of the Navy. This hearing noted that 
since at least 2004, PLAN had acquired multiple new vessels and aircraft including 
21 submarines, 8 destroyers, and 24 advanced fighters. Evidence was also presented 
of forthcoming aircraft carrier acquisition and purchases of anti-ship cruise missiles, 
land attack cruise missiles, and advanced naval mines. China’s apparent desire to 
develop anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) intended to degrade the force multiply- 
ing capabilities of U.S. aircraft carriers is particularly germane to U.S. strategic and 
operational planning.36 
     These developments are augmented by China’s improving C4ISR capabilities, 
increasing professionalism and skills by Chinese military personnel, China’s 
growing ability to deny U.S. military access to its littoral waters and the Western 
Pacific, and increasing advances in its naval platforms and personnel training 
quality increase the dangers facing forward-deployed U.S. forces requiring them to 
operate at greater distances to maintain operational safety. Additional implications 
of increasing Chinese maritime strategic reach include Beijing’s failure to adhere 
to international maritime norms and Exclusive Economic Zones; the possibility of 
conflict due to misinterpretation of Beijing’s view of international maritime law, 
and China’s growing qualitative superiority over most East Asian navies.37 
     A May 20, 2010 hearing analyzed China’s emerging military aerospace and 
commercial aviation capabilities including their potential military implications for 
the U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force Bruce Lemkin mentioned China’s 
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determination to increase its military capabilities including those of its aerospace 
and ballistic missile forces. Noting that while China technologically lags behind the 
U.S., it is rapidly improving its long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare, 
computer network attack efforts, and offensive strike capabilities while concluding 
that the U.S. must “stay ahead of the game” and maintain its ability to deter, defeat, 
and attack.38  
     Roger Cliff noted many Chinese fighters are beyond visual range capable, that 
their fighters and bombers carry precision guided munitions, and that their  
exercises are more realistic and conducted in unfamiliar airspace at night and over 
water.  He also noted that the PLAAF does not have stealthy aircraft, has minimal 
area refueling and strategic airlift capabilities, and that its training is inferior to the 
U.S.’. Mark Stokes noted China is placing acute reliance on ballistic missiles 
because they are hard to defend against and because all Taiwanese residents live 
within seven minutes of destruction from a ballistic missile.39 
     Rebecca Grant of the observed that the previous 15 years have seen China 
advance from a regional actor to a power with nascent cross-Pacific military 
capability. She also stressed that China currently has the capability to significantly 
interfere with U.S. air and naval operations in the Taiwan Strait and beyond and 
that Beijing can achieve military success from counterattacks on U.S. aircraft, 
cyberlinks, satellites, and ships to disrupt operations. Jeff Hagen stated that U.S. 
power projection is most adversely affected by Chinese anti-access threats to U.S. 
bases with only Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base being excluded, state-of-the-art 
surface-to-air missiles, and a fourth generation air force with precision air-to-air 
and air-to-ground capabilities. Consequently, he urged the U.S. be prepared for a 
broad range of contingencies involving China.40 
      A March 10, 2011 hearing focused on Chinese national security policy 
narratives. Topics addressed in this forum include narratives and policy debates on 
East Asian geopolitics and China’s emergence as a great power; how the PRC 
formulate national security narratives in media and public diplomacy, and Beijing’s 
military modernization narratives and the PLA’s foreign policy role. Gilbert Rozman 
sees Beijing’s rhetoric toward foreign leaders such as George W. Bush, Barack 
Obama, and Hillary Clinton becoming increasingly vitriolic as well as toward 
countries such as Japan and South Korea.41 
     Ashley Esarey noted the contrast between China’s Vice-Premier Li Keqiang 
claiming China had a long history of peaceful development standing in contrast to 
its volatile 20th century of civil war and upheavals including clashes with India, the 
Soviet Union, the U.S. and Vietnam during the 20th century. Stokes notes that 
Beijing uses domestic and foreign media outlets, military-to-military relations; 
academic exchanges, and business interests to formulate its public diplomacy while 
engaging in information operations to promote its strategic objectives. John Park 
stresses the rhetorical importance of “core interests” in Chinese strategic narratives 
as opposed to “mutual interests” in U.S. strategic narratives. Abraham Denmark 
maintains that China seeks to restore its position as the dominant Asian power and 
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that it can use the PLA to enhance the international system’s health or success or 
erode it by emphasizing preemption as a “strategically defensive act.”42 
    The growing influence of maritime disputes in the ECS and SCS were 
scrutinized during an April 4, 2013 hearing. Michael McDevitt stressed that ECS 
issues are most important to the U.S. contending these waters are one area in the 
East Asian littoral where a shooting war is possible. He went on to contend that the 
cross-straits relationship between China and Taiwan was stable, that the risk of 
conflict was low, but that conflict could not be ruled out due to China’s refusal to 
renounce the use of force. McDevitt also noted that the ECS and the Yellow Sea 
are home waters for Chinese, Japanese, North and South Korean and Taiwanese 
navies, and the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet and that commercial traffic in either of 
these waters can reach six of China’s ten largest ports. His remarks also stressed 
the complexity of SCS jurisdiction to the multiple powers involved, China’s nine-
dashed maps claims, and the increased willingness of the U.S. to become involved 
in these waters despite rhetorical claims of neutrality on sovereignty over these 
waters.43 
    Michael Swaine noted that increased assertiveness among SCS claimants has 
occurred since 2007 prompted by increased efforts to explore natural gas and oil 
resources and increasing deployment of ships and fishing vessels to these waters.  
He also referenced Beijing’s May 2011 cutting of a towed array cable the 
Vietnamese were pulling; China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal and the ensuring 
April 2012 dispute; the June 2012 Chinese announcement of exploration blocks 
within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone; and the beginning of Chinese 
incursions into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands region in October 2012.44 
     A March 13, 2014 hearing examined China and evolving East Asian security 
dynamics. Robert Sutter mentioned that China has used coercion to gain control of 
disputed territory and seeks additional geographical aggrandizement, noted its use 
of coast guard forces augmented by diplomatic pressure and threats, serious 
economic punishments, and increasing naval and air power features to conduct 
exercises in contested areas. He also noted that whether Chinese expansionism 
advances contends on regional response asserting China has long sought to remove 
great powers from its periphery in order to enhance its security and dominance.45 
     Walter Lohman noted the complications in U.S. interactions with regional 
organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
observing that ASEAN’s autonomy is not necessarily in U.S. interests. Lohman 
mentioned that ASEAN’s strategic objectives toward the (SCS) are not congruent 
with U.S. interests which seek to maintain freedom of navigation and security of its 
allies while ASEAN seeks to engage China.46 
     Chinese space and counterspace programs were reviewed during a February 18, 
2015 hearing. Matters addressed included Beijing’s civilian/dual-use and military 
space programs, China space program inputs, and implications for the U.S. Joan 
Johnson-Freese contended that the U.S. could not control Chinese space ambitions 
the way it can control airspace and that the U.S. space strategies must include space 
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situational awareness, resiliency, increased transparency, and confidence-building 
measures. Dean Cheng announced that future wars will involve land, sea, air, 
space, and cyberspace domains incorporating joint operations and that establishing 
information dominance is a hallmark objective of Chinese warfighting strategy 
with space dominance being a key Chinese military aspirational objective.47 
     Tate Nurkin stressed the critical importance of espionage in Chinese technology 
acquisition efforts and Stokes stressed the highly centralized role exerted by the 
PLA in Chinese space program activities while also detailing the highly critical 
role of espionage in Beijing’s space technology efforts by referencing a March 
2014 Justice Department report covering the theft of controlled U.S. items pertinent 
to Chinese space and aerospace programs between January 2008–March 2014 
including thermal imaging cameras; electronics used in military radar and electronic 
warfare; radiation hardened materials and gyroscopes; military optics; and rocket/ 
space launch technical data.48  
     Beijing’s increasing offensive missile forces was addressed during an April 1, 
2015 commission hearing. Topics covered during this forum included China’s 
conventional missiles, nuclear weapons and emerging missile technologies, and 
implications of these developments for the U.S. Dennis Gormley contended the 
U.S. should focus on modest responses to cruise missile defenses where we respond 
to massive attacks by enemies emphasizing hardening airfields, C4I facilities in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and diversifying aircraft placement emphasizing survivability 
instead of efficiency to complicate adversary planning. He also recommended 
denying China a “free-ride” for its most precise means of delivering land-attack 
cruise missiles by complicating the delicate timing inherent in Beijing’s coordination 
of first-wave ballistic and cruise missile strikes and the timing of subsequent 
follow-up air operations.49 
     Christopher Twomey emphasized its diversifying, growing, and modernizing 
nuclear forces including deployment of modern survivable DF-31 and DF-31A 
ICBM’s, the forthcoming mating of JL-2 missiles with Jin Class submarines, and 
the potential of 200-300 MIRVed ICBM warheads targeted at the U.S. in the next 
decade. Christopher Yeaw commented that China continues emphasizing sur- 
vivability and penetrability in its strategic forces including road-mobile, sea-based, 
and dispersed air forces, maneuvering reentry vehicles, and stealth, and hypersonic 
assets. Independent Special Operations Command contractor Robert Haddick noted 
that China’s rapid military modernization increases the cost of the U.S. sustaining 
its post-World War II Asia-Pacific forward presence strategy, but that the U.S. has 
no alternative to maintaining this strategy due to the region’s paramount importance 
to U.S. national living standards and role as premier global power.50  
     The commission addressed Chinese military force projection and expeditionary 
capabilities in a January 21, 2016 hearing. Topics addressed examined included 
driving factors for Chinese expeditionary capabilities, preparing for joint operations, 
and implications of these developments. Oriana Skyler Mastro observed that 
Chinese official statements, white papers, and semi-official writings suggest China 
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sees the U.S.’ regional presence as a destabilizing factor and a key hindrance in its 
rise to what Xi Jinping views as China’s rightful place as the regionally dominant 
power. She also noted the increasing international travel of Chinese nationals is 
placing increasing emphasis on China providing physical security for them as a 
result of Chinese citizens being threatened in other countries by being willing to 
engage in overseas operations.51 
     Timothy Heath noted Sino–U.S. cooperation against piracy off the Horn of 
Africa in 2009 while also stressing that subsequent decades will see Beijing 
enhance its expeditionary capabilities by deploying aircraft carrier and other naval 
task forces, strategic airlift, special operations units, counterterrorism teams, and 
strategic bomber of fighter aircraft to areas of concern to Chinese strategic 
interests. David Finkelstein noted that Beijing’s national security policymakers are 
disestablishing military regions and replacing them with standing joint war zones 
or theaters of operation and increasing joint operational capability which will 
include the newly created PLA Rocket Force responsible for conventional and 
nuclear missiles and a reorganized Central Military Commission.52 
     Mark Cozad stressed that while none of PLA’s joint exercises have addressed 
expeditionary capabilities, Beijing has tested joint exercise operational concepts for 
Taiwan-centered operations and chain reactions along China’s periphery while also 
noting the need for expeditionary capabilities will increase as China’s overseas 
interests continue expanding. Christopher D. Yung maintains that the PLAN will 
eventually master the “tyranny of distance” in its out of area operations and sustain 
the logistics infrastructure and sustainment capacity necessary to acquire power 
projection capabilities which may threaten U.S. interests and assets.53 
     Kristen Guinness commented that an increasing Chinese expeditionary capability 
in the SCS and beyond could produce increased contact and risk of miscalculation 
and escalation with U.S. forces and that China may use the PLA as an expeditionary 
force to shape the security environment and increase competition with the U.S. and 
involve itself in regional topics and beyond that are against or restrict U.S. goals 
and objectives. She also noted that such capabilities could enable China to provide 
faster international humanitarian assistance and disaster response and make Asian 
nations more receptive to U.S. efforts to shape the security environment and 
supporting U.S. objectives in this region.54 
     A March 21, 2016 hearing addressed China and the U.S.’ rebalance to Asia.  
Dan Blumenthal contended that the U.S. needs to see its Asia-Pacific interests as 
linked to the post-World War II strategy of maintaining preponderant power across 
Eurasia, that U.S. security policies and military strategies must operate with a 
greater diplomatic political framework, and that the U.S. needs a permanent  
strategic presence southwest of Okinawa. Kathleen Hicks observed the Obama 
Administration has not clearly, consistently, or coherently articulated a rebalance 
strategy and needs a single all-encompassing strategic document to achieve this, 
that defense budget cuts have limited DOD’s ability to implement critical re- 
balancing initiatives, that the threat from Chinese A2AD assets is rising, and that 
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China’s tolerance for risk is exceeding expectations demonstrated by creating 
artificial features in SCS waters. Mira Raap-Hooper urged the U.S. to recalibrate 
its regional strategy by clarifying the 1951 treaty commitment to the Philippines, 
publicly coordinate partner capacity building with countries such as the Philippines 
and Vietnam, strengthen freedom of navigation programs and increase the 
frequency of DOD’s annual reports on these events to quarterly and detail the 
nature of challenges to freedom of navigation, and produce an annual interagency 




The Commission, its professional staff, and contractors have also issued numerous 
studies documenting its work in multiple areas relating to Western Pacific strategic 
issues. A January 2007 report on China’s Anti-Satellite (ASAT), space warfare, 
policies, and doctrines, contained an extensive literature review and summary of 
Chinese writings on these topics. Report recommendations included the U.S. 
initiating and engaging in a dialogue on these issues with China focusing on: 
 Reducing Chinese misperceptions of US space policy 
 Increasing Chinese space weapons transparency 
 Probing Chinese interest in verifiable agreements 
 Multilateral vs bilateral approaches on space subjects 
 Economic Consequences of Using Space Weapons 
 Reconsidering U.S. High Tech Exports to China.56 
 
March 2009 saw a report on the PLA’s abilities to execute military action in a 
regional military conflict. Topics addressed in this treatise included the PLA’s 
ability to implement military action against Taiwan while also attacking U.S. and 
allied military forces and assets. Document conclusions include the PLA being 
postured to conduct multiple offensive options in a Taiwan crisis and a comparable 
ability to employ various anti-access measures to complicate U.S. responses in the 
Taiwan Strait and other East Asian venues; noting that advancing ballistic and 
cruise missiles, counter C4ISR, counter-space systems and strategies, and modern 
naval and air strike formations complicating the future direction of Asian security 
architectures. An additional emphasis is for U.S. forces to retain the ability to 
rapidly respond to regional events, conduct and sustain operations supporting 
multiple interests, and the danger of China perceiving that its capabilities restrict 
U.S. freedom of action could complicate peaceful problem resolution and lead to 
miscalculation and escalation.57 
     A June 2013 report examined declining Taiwanese defense spending and its 
potential impact on Taipei’s military preparedness. This assessment noted that 
between 1994 and 2013 Taiwan’s defense budget declined from 3.8–2.1% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and during this same period it declined from 24.3% of the 
total government budget to 16.2%. Additional report findings involve Taiwan 
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transitioning from an active duty conscript military of 270,000 to an all-volunteer 
force of 215,000. These trends have lead U.S. and other observers to suggest the 
continuation of current trends may make Taiwan unable to maintain existing 
operational capabilities, readiness levels, and equipment inventories. It also noted 
that since 2009, Taipei has focused on improving its asymmetric weapons capa- 
bilities including stealthy patrol aircraft and additional mobile missile squadrons 
and radars which it believes will be less vulnerable to Chinese precision strike 
capabilities. This assessment concludes that Taiwan may seek closer political ties 
with the U.S. and acquire additional weapons from Washington while also 
incentivizing Beijing to take greater risk in its cross-strait policies due to Taipei’s 
diminishing deterrent capability.58 
     January 14, 2014 saw the commission issue a report on China’s November 23, 
2013 declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over much of the 
ECS including the Senkaku Islands contested by it and Japan in an effort to 
strengthen its ability to enforce its expansive ECS claims. This declaration also 
affects South Korea and the report’s authors cautioned that China’s inconsistent 
adherence to international air and maritime operational norms could see it employ 
tactical methods foreign pilots may interpret as hostile increasing the risk of 
escalation; the high possibility of escalation risk if China intercepts Japanese 
military aircraft in the ADIZ; and China’s announcement giving adjacent states and 
the U.S. the opportunity to asset their rights to ECS airspace and increase their 
aerial patrols.59 
     A June 1, 2015 analysis of China’s 2015 defense white paper stressed the 
ongoing importance of the maritime domain, a complex security environment with 
multiple traditional and non-traditional external and internal security threats, space 
and cyberspace as commanding heights in strategic competition, the importance of 
military professionalism, ideological discipline, and civil-military integration, and 
the need for readiness and preparing for military struggle by training in realistic 
conditions to fight and win wars in multiple operational environments.60 
     Less than two weeks later, the commission issued a report documenting U.S. 
surveillance of Chinese land reclamation projects in the SCS. This document 
described the May 20, 2015 flight of a Navy P-8A Poseidon surveillance plane 
from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines to Subi, Mischief, and Fiery Cross 
Reefs in the SCS where China has engaged in extensive land reclamation projects 
to bolster its territorial claims and establish a permanent military presence. An 
expanded Chinese military presence could enable it to improve its offensive and 
defensive military capabilities by deploying long-range radars and ISR and devel- 
oping airstrips for carrier based aircraft enabling them to conduct sustained air 
operations. The Poseidon’s crew received eight radio warnings from the Chinese 
telling them to leave. CNN reporter Jim Sciutto accompanied the crew and reported 
on the mission which received significant media coverage.   
     Multiple countries reacted to this incident including Australia, Japan, the 
Philippines, and Singapore and this flight is considered part of an effort by 
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Washington to “name and shame” China’s aggressive activities. This offers 
Southeast Asian countries the opportunity to collectively and publicly seize the 
international moral high ground and develop a unified position against China.61 
     In October 2015 the commission produced an analysis China’s New YJ-18 
antiship cruise missile on some PLAN navy submarines and surface ships. The YJ-
18 may significantly increase China’s A2AD capabilities against U.S. ships 
operating in the Western Pacific during potential conflicts, has a subsonic cruise 
speed of about Mach 0.8 with the capability of accelerating to Mach 3.0, has a 290 
nautical mile range, and is capable of flying only few meters above the sea to evade 
radar detection. This nautical range gives it a threat ring of approximately 264,200 
square nautical miles and enables the YJ-18 to potentially hold at risk a Western 
Pacific carrier strike group.62 
     A March 2016 commission report on China’s ADIZ in the ECS and SCS made 
the following assessments on implications for the U.S.: 
 The possibility of tense mid-air encounters between U.S. and Chinese aircraft as 
part of China’s increasing willingness to challenge U.S. military aircraft in con- 
tested maritime areas and U.S. willingness to conduct military flights near Chinese 
occupied land features. 
 A Chinese ADIZ in the SCS could complicate state and commercial air 
operations in the SCS and prompt other claimants to SCS territory to establish their 
own ADIZs. 
 The development of Chinese enforcement capabilities of its SCS ADIZ could 
challenge the political status quo and give China de facto control over these waters 
in a scenario short of war. 
 Infrastructure and platforms used to enforce an ADIZ could have military 
applications in an SCS contingency. 
 The growth of China’s SCS radar infrastructure increases its ability to collect 
intelligence on U.S. forces in the region and monitor other countries military and 
commercial activities.63 
 
Another report that month described China’s efforts to counter the U.S. forward 
presence in the Asia Pacific. This analysis noted China engages in military-to-
military exchanges with regional states to create leverage applying pressure on the 
U.S. and its partners, Beijing’s using economic engagement and coercion to 
influence the behavior of U.S. allies and partners China considers critical in sup- 
porting U.S. forward presence and force projection capability within the Western 
Pacific, and China conducting activities to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its 
allies to undermine deployment of a U.S.-led regional security architecture in the 
Asia-Pacific and restrict U.S. presence and force projection capability if conflict 
occurs. China’s application of three warfares: psychological, media, and legal on 
the international stage are all part of Beijing’s efforts to restrict the U.S.’ Western 
Pacific forward presence and power projection.64  
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     In May 2016 the commission issued a report on China’s expanding ability to 
conduct conventional missile strikes on Guam. This document announced that 
Chinese weapons capable of attacking targets on militarily important U.S. assets in 
this territory include the DF-26 IRBM and ASBM, and air and sea launched land 
attack cruise missiles (LACM). Chinese analysts see Guam as a highly important 
feature in alleged U.S. containment strategy and see it as an anchor for regional 
U.S. forces and the second island chain since it contains Apra Naval Base, 
Andersen Air Force Base, and approximately 6,000 military personnel which are 
critical for crisis response and large Asia Pacific security contingency operations.  
Report recommendations for enhancing Guam’s security include hardening facilities 
on Guam to increase the costs and uncertainty of a Chinese attack, dispersing 
regional U.S. military facilities, investing in new missile defense capabilities,  
revisiting the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty by incorporating ground 
launched short, medium, and intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missile 
systems into U.S. regional force structure, and maintaining superior regional strike 
capabilities such as the Long-Range Strike Bomber program and the Virginia class 
submarine missile payload module.65  
A July 12, 2016 International Arbitration Panel ruled that China’s claims 
against the Philippines in the SCS had no international legal validity. China’s 
reaction to this ruling was extremely hostile and this analysis stressed China could 
increase its military presence in these disputed areas, apply economic sanctions on 
the Philippines, and conduct land reclamation on Scarborough Reef. Implications 
for the U.S. stressed in this report include that if China fails to abide by the ruling it 
sends a signal to the world that adhering to international law is optional, that it vital 
for the U.S. and like-minded countries to make public and concerted efforts to 
affirm the ruling and enforce it, and that it is vital for the U.S. and ASEAN to push 




Commission assessments are regularly cited in congressional debates and national 
security forums. On July 17, 2002 Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) noted the release 
of the Commission’s 2002 annual report stressing the fragmented nature of U.S. 
policy toward China, the absence of U.S. institutional mechanisms for monitoring 
national security concerns involving Chinese efforts to raise capital in U.S. debt 
and equity markets and Beijing’s delivery of technologies and weapons systems to 
terrorist sponsoring states threatening the U.S. in Asia.67 On November 17, 2011 
Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) referenced a Commission report indicating the 
robust nature of China’s military space program with 57 of its 70 orbiting satellites 
controlled by the PLA.68 Current commission member Daniel Slane and former 
commissioner Patrick Mulloy spoke at a December 7, 2015 forum hosted by the 
Center for a New American Security discussing the recent publication of Peter 
Navarro’s Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World.69 
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The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission has become an 
essential source for military and civilian policymakers and scholars to understand 
Western Pacific strategic developments affecting the U.S., its allies, and potential 
adversaries, the evolving nature of Sino–U.S. bilateral relations, and the significance 
and impact of Chinese security policy and military capability as the Trump 
Administration begins. It reflects multiple viewpoints and perspectives and has 
been able to achieve generally bipartisan consensus in its annual reports with there 
being only five commissioners dissenting from overall annual report findings 
during the commission’s 15-year existence.70 The Commission has become a 
valuable contributor to the debate on how developments in this critically important 
region affect the U.S. and its allies and on the overall multifaceted scope of the 
bilateral Sino–U.S. relationship. Concerted effort should be made to consult its 
works by military and civilian policymakers as well as the academic and business 
communities and individuals interested in gaining enhanced understanding of the 
critical military and economic importance of the strategic competition between 
China and the U.S. in the Western Pacific.     
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